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STUDENT NOTES
RATIONALITY IN RATE-ImAKING.-Mr. Justice Holmes' observa-
tion that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases"' is
illustrated adequately by the maelstrom of decisions and comments
on public utility regulation by rate-making. The legalist's search
for the panacea of a catch-all major premise has resulted often in
a sugar-coated placebo that has no actual effect on concrete cases.
The wandering day-by-day factual holdings of the courts are
strongly indicative that the rate-making process is not susceptible
to a singular approach or even to a binary one. The Hope2 case
and the Natural Gas Pipeline Co.3 cases are the Court's admission
of this, and they are in harmony with the neo-legal philosophy that,
"The trend of modern decisions is to administer justice in accord-
ance with the realities disclosed by the facts; no legal fiction, how-
ever revered in antiquity, should be given effect when it is clearly
antagonistic to the facts, to common sense, and to natural justice.",
This article submits that the two cases are not enigmatic decisions
but are ones that lay a basis for a rate-making process that will
yield results asymptotic to that abstract principle of justice.
From the common law property concept that "when private
property is devoted to public use, it is subject to public regulation",,
has descended the rationale for public utility law. One accepted
manner of regulation has been by price-fixing, which necessitates
the incorporation into that law of the general principles of constitu-
tional law prohibiting deprivation of property without due process
of law or taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation.6 Originally, price-fixing of the commodity or service of
a business classified as a public utility was accomplished through
the imposition of the affirmative common law duty that the prices
charged had to be "reasonable"; violation of this duty allowed the
injured party a recovery back of the overcharge. 7 The retroactive-
ness, inequality, and inadequacy of this judicial process of control
caused the intervention of the legislators to accomplish the price
fixing either by direct action or by delegation of their powers and
I Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
2 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
3 Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
4 Wirt Franklin Petroleum Corp. v. Guen, 139 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1944).
5 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
6 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
7 W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885).
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functions because of the complexities involved" to administrative
tribunals, with the general standard that the prices fixed be "just
and reasonable."9 Thus, instead of a retroactive determination of
reasonableness, in futuro decisions were made in the hope of
achieving stability and uniformity, The traditional method used
to arrive at a fixed price or rate was to adjust the price or rate so
that a reasonable and fair return could be made by the utility on
its predicted property value to be devoted to the public use.10 This
required determination of the value of the property so used, i.e., a
"rate base", and a "rate of return" to be allowed on that base.1
The defining of this rate base and its component parts resulted in
continual disagreement.1 2
This process of control is the focus of several legal prbolems
and is the causation of differing views concerning the solution of
a concrete case depending on the acceptance or resolution of basic
theories or philosophies. The following questions, which are some
of the usual ingredients of a rate-making decision, exemplify this:
1. Is it necessary to find a rate-base with its superimposed rate
of return in order to arrive at a reasonable rate?13
2. If a rate-base approach is used, should any one formula be
required; i.e., what concept of value should apply?14
3. What is a proper relation between the doctrines of admin-
istrative finality and of the supremacy of the law?15
4. Are the only interests to be respected and protected those
of the investors and the consumers?16
8 "There was a time in the history of this country when carriers and public-
service corporations were so few that the legislature itself might have performed
the labor; but, by reason of the rapid growth of population and the great in-
crease in the number of such corporations, it has become impracticable for the
legislature to discharge that duty. Moreover, many rates may require alterations
from time to time." Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693 (1908).) For example, see W. VA. REv. CODE c. 24, art. 3, § 1 (1931), providing that
"All charges, tolls, and rates shall be just and reasonable."
10 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276 (1923).
11 Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas. Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909); 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUA-
TION OF PROPERTY C. 30 (1937).
12 Hardman, Present Value Doctrine and Present Investment Doctrine, 30
W. VA. L.Q. 70 (1924).
'3 Freeman, Enlightened Judgment Approach to Rate of Return, 61 IAv.
L. REv. 1380 (1948).
14fHale, The "Fair Value" Merry-Go-Round, 1898 to 1938: A Forty-Year
Journey from Rates.Based-on-Value to Value-Based-on-Rates, 33 ILL. L. REv.
517 (1939).
1 Compare Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 284 U.S. 370
(1932), with United Railways & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West, Chairman, 280
U.S. 234 (1930); Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies,
27 W. VA. L.Q. 207 (1921); Hardman, Administrative Finality in Claims for
Overcharges, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 77 (1948).
'
0 See Justices Jackson's and Frankfurter's dissent in the Hope case.
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Certainly the listing is incomplete, but the questions demon-
strate that there are several fundamentals within the rate-making
process that give footings upon which individual judges diverge.
Usually fair argument can be given to support one or another
answer to a question. With regard to question one, the rate-base-
rate-of-return method has been customary, 7 although the scope of
the Hope case might now conceivably include other methods, such
as the approach suggested by one writer that only the investor
is entitled to a fair return as the utility itself is affected by the
public interest and not just its property. 8 The acceptance of
the rule of Smyth v. Ames;9 requiring that the fair or present value
concept be used in finding a rate-base, answered question two for a
time, although its principle was continually under attack.20 Various
answers have been supplied to question three, depending upon the
exigencies of each case. The usual view is that because the rates
fixed look to the future, the fixing of the rates is a legislative act, 21
subject, however, to judicial review of some sort.22 In cases where
a recovery back is sought because of an unreasonbale rate, the func-
.tion is viewed as administrative, divided into judicial and legisla-
tive components. 23 The answer to question four is usually assumed
to be "yes", 24 but Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in the Hope case is
a signpost to a changing outlook of the courts.
The dissent of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in the South-
western Bell Telephone case 25 strongly indicated that determina-
tion of a reasonable rate is largely founded upon formed judg-
ments. These judgments, of course, must be deduced from a multi-
17 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276(1923).
18 BAUER, TRANSFORMING PUBLIC UTIurY REGUmAoN 168 (1950).
'9 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
20 The principle has been "widely rejected by the great weight of economic
opinion, by authoritative legislative investigations, b utilit commissions
throughout the country, and by impressive judicial cissents. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 807 U.S. 109
(1939).
21 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439 (1903).
22 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (only to check
for substantial evidence in the record); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352
(1913), Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (an indepen.
dent enquiry into the facts).
23 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
24 "So long as the public interest-i.e., that of investor's and consumer's-
is safeguarded, it seems that the Commission may formulate its own standards.
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
25 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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tude of preliminary facts,28 and whether the deductive process be
considered legislative, judicial, or administrative, is a matter of
classification. Whatever the label, it must be performed by some
person or group of persons. The Hope case is but a confession by
the Court that the demands of society in this field of law can be
served better by others who are as capable or more capable than
the courts to form the necessary judgments.27 Administrative agen-
cies have continually proved their reliability and competency to
contend with the regulatory problems that the complexities of
society present today,28 and the Hope case acknowledges this.
Mr. Justice Douglas declared in the Hope case that the com-
mission was not bound to any one formula in determining a rate-
base, that infirmities in the method used would be tolerated, and
that only the end result on the commission's action would be
judicially scrutinized. This removes any possibility of a negative
attack on the rate orders, leaving only positive proofs to destroy
them. That is, within the requirements of due process, 29 the failure
of the commission to perform an act or to perform it in a certain
manner is no longer suitable grounds for reversal;30 positive show-
ing that the end result is not just and reasonable is demanded.
If the Court has "conceded the commission the prerogative of
ascertaining the rate-base", 31 what function has the Court retained
for itself in the rate-making process? Certainly it has retained the
20 The standard of the Hope case is not "so vague and devoid of meaning
as to render judicial review a perfunctory process. It is a standard of finance
resting on stubborn facts." Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1947). "Without any evidence on this essential
issue, there is no basis for application of any standard and the judicial review
authorized by the statute becomes a formal but futile gesture." Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
27 "A major question presented for determination by the commission was
the ascertainment of a proper rate base for Safe Harbor. This problem is
really one of valuation and of accounting. The other major question for the
commission was the determination of a 'fair return' on that rate base. Both
questions are peculiarly within the administrative capacity of the Commission."
Safe Harbor Power Corp v. F.P.C., 179 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949); see also note
33 infra.
28 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
20 "The Fifth Amendment in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing
that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process.
And the guaranty of due process, as has been often held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." Nebbia v. People, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
30 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 156 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1949); cf.
Colorado-Wyoming v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324"U.S. 626 (1945).
31 Cf. The Hope Case and Recent Federal Decisions, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 305,
307 (1952).
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right to review, consistent with the due process clause and the
doctrine of the supremacy of the law. 2  The evaluation of the
reasonableness of a rate, however, necessitates its comparison to a
standard. Apparently the Court has chosen to set aside any stare
decisis yardstick-reference to any one pre-stated standard is no
longer requisite. What, then, is to be the guide when a rate is
reviewed? The Court answered this by its placing of the burden
of proof3 3 which, in effect, invited the lawyers to formulate the
necessary standard for measurement for each case. The lawyer is
now freed from scratching among the ashes of past decisions for
arguments that one general proposition, rather than another, i.e.,
fair value v. prudent investment, is the true method always to be
used to determine a rate-base, when neither may be particularly
applicable or when some method other than the rate-base method
is a better approach. He is now entitled to formulate a contem-
porary method, to prove the logic of its component parts, to show
its rationality to the particular facts in dispute, and to do all this
independent of the commission's method. If he succeeds in prov.
ing the fitness of his method and its actual answering of the par-
ticular questions, then he has established a reference point which
the court will use to test the end result of the commission's order.
The commission is entitled to justify the determined rate by any
rational method, whether by using the rate-base-rate-of-return
method, attraction of capital theory,34 flexible rate of return
theory,"15 value to the consumer method,"8 or others. The one seek-
ing to upset it has a better chance for success not by showing the
piece-meal inadequacy of the commission's method, but by a posi-
tive demonstration that another is more suitable. No longer is the
attacker bound to have his case stand or fall on a standard or
method formerly approved by the court, for the Hope decision
removed all judicial approval of any particular standard or method
formerly in vogue.
32 ". . the reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters
of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this
class of cases." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
33 "Moreover, the Commission's order does not become suspect by reason
of the fact that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which
carries a presumption of validity. And he who would upset the rate order
under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that
it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences," Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
34Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923), dissent.
35 See note 13 supra.
36 Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
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The present position of the Court is not one of complete
capitulation to administrative finality, which is only as final in any
particular case as the court allows it to be in its role as final arbi-
trator, but it is simply recognition of administrative competence. "7
If the above states correctly the rationale of the Hope and the
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. holdings, then the cases portend a series
of decisions that will, with apparent disregard for consistency,
accept, reject, or compromise all the former arguments of the rate-
making cases. Whether fair value, prudent investment, present
market value, historical costs, or other methods are used to cal-
culate a rate-base, whether depreciation of certain items, good will,
going concern value, or abandoned properties are included in the
rate-base, or whether the rate-base is used at all-each will be
accepted or rejected in a particular case. This may lead to in-
consistency or confusion in the eyes of those seeking formalism
and generalities, but this process of judicial "inclusion and ex-
clusion" is the only proper way to define the relativity between
society's and the individual's interest in a problem which has such
a vast number of factorials as does public utility regulation.
It is submitted, then, that the Hope and the Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co. cases were a deliberate clearing away of the debris of
former decisions so that there could be the desirable fluidity and
flexibility in the rate-making process, and that this enlightened
approach to a practical problem will continue-at least so long as
the liberal element reigns in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
L. A. S.
THE RIGHT OF PETITION.-In the parade of decisions on the
Constitution and its principles, the right to petition' has been and
still is accorded little opportunity to participate in all the legal
pomp and ceremony accompanying the procession. Unlike freedom
of speech, it is unusual for this constitutional guarantee to be
considered separately from its cohorts. Greater contemplation is
"'? ".. . in a question of rate-making there is a strong presumption in favor
of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after a full
hearing." Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 (1917). "The limits set by the
court are deliberately broad, resulting both from notions of special competence
and the conception of rate-making as a primarily legislative process." Wash-
ington (as Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d, I1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"'Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. AMEND. I.
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